With the fall of Lashio, the Burmese junta’s grip on power appears increasingly tenuous, signalling a potential turning point in the conflict. The capture of the headquarters of the Burmese junta’s northeastern regional military command (RMC) by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and its allies signals potential assaults on the next big target, Pyin Oo Lwin, which houses crucial military training facilities, including the Defence Services Academy (DSA) founded in 1954. Located roughly 150 kilometres from Lashio, Pyin Oo Lwin’s fall would further weaken the regime’s hold and greatly compromise its ability to maintain any presence in northern Shan State or resecure access to the Myanmar-China border in the foreseeable future.
The trend of these offensives since the launch of Operation 1027 suggests that these predictions—made mostly by independent analysts and supporters of the pro-resistance forces—are likely to come true. The takeover of the highly strategic Myanmar Air Force’s central command in Meiktila, situated just over 290 kilometres away from Lashio, followed by cities like Mandalay and Naypyidaw, are other possibilities that could unfold in the days ahead.
However, the situation is perhaps not that straightforward and needs to be perceived through the prism of how Myanmar’s big neighbours, particularly China, envision the plausible outcome. While the MNDAA’s successes in Lashio and the takeover of the township of Mogok, famously known for its rubies, by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) are real, this could well align with Beijing’s plans for Myanmar. China’s strategic interest in Myanmar, particularly its influence over border regions, is well-documented..
China’s calculated manoeuvrings
China’s strategic manoeuvres in Myanmar have always exhibited a dual approach, and the current conflict is no exception. However, the scale and unpredictability of operations this time around surpass earlier interventions. Insights from various stakeholders—including NUG representatives, National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) members, rebel leaders, and political party representatives—reveal a complex tapestry of Beijing’s interventions, achievements, future expectations, and leverage in the current situation.
China’s interventions, such as the ceasefire brokered in northern Shan State, indicate Beijing’s strategic perception of the conflict. Primarily, China aims to ensure stability along its borders, avoiding any escalation that might necessitate a recalibration of its traditional strategy of engaging with all factions, including the military junta. “China is not inclined towards rebalancing,” said one stakeholder, adding, “which is why it has encouraged the Wa and the UWSA to take a more proactive stance.”
The march of the United Wa State Army (UWSA) to Lashio on Saturday is seen by many Myanmar observers as an indication of the “growing Chinese plan” for northern Shan and Naypyidaw. Although on the surface, the UWSA troops are said to have been there to provide protection to its liaison offices in Lashio and to protect residents and properties it owns.
The message from the Wa spokesperson, Nyi Rang, that the group wants peace in Shan State and “does not support anyone in the conflict” says a lot, as it comes from a group that wields substantial influence in the area, not just within its own Self-Administered Zone or the “Wa State,” which is de facto independent from Burma. The UWSA has extremely close relations with the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC). The FPNCC, which includes the Arakan Army (AA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the MNDAA, and the TNLA (also members of the Northern Alliance), is the largest negotiating body of Ethnic Armed Organisation (EAOs) or Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs) in the country. Beijing formally engages with the FPNCC, recognizing it as an EAO negotiation body in discussions with the Burmese central government. Myanmar experts have often argued that the UWSA and the FPNCC are not allies in a strict sense, although their relationship obviously goes beyond that of ordinary peers. The FPNCC and the UWSA have been described as “quasi-allies” with common threats, flexibility, and internal constraints keeping them together.
Thus, the presence of the UWSA in conflict, which is a rarity, speaks volumes about how the so-called plans the Chinese have prepared are possibly working towards their intended goal. The plans to achieve the goal are based on a two-pronged approach: one central focus on Naypyidaw, working with the junta to find a resolution to the present crisis, most likely through an election; and the other a central-peripheral approach focusing on engaging more with the EAOs.
Given its historical and cultural ties with the Wa, Kokangs, and Palaungs, Beijing views these groups as natural allies, with the KIA also integral to this alignment. China’s tacit support, evident from the capture of Laukkai to Lashio, reflects its greater comfort with these groups compared to the junta, which Beijing has criticized for funnelling money to promote cybercrimes along the borders.
On the other hand, when it comes to the National Unity Government (NUG) and its presence in Northern Shan, Beijing is even more cautious. The hierarchy in the Chinese Communist regime is said to be averse to the idea of allowing any room for the NUG and its alliance partners to operate in northern Shan. “It is quite simple, China sees the NUG as close to the West and working towards total democracy, which it does not want,” said a senior NUG leader who did not want to be identified.
Indeed, within the ranks of the NUG, there is a growing recognition that China will likely persist in collaborating with the junta and consolidating support from the Wa, the Northern Alliance, and other smaller armed groups to negotiate a ceasefire and devise an election plan. As one NUG leader put it, “This is known, but we shall continue to work for our goal to establish a federal democratic structure.”
Some of the smaller groups that are likely to align with the junta in the event of an election and reactivation of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) include the Shan State Army North (SSA-N), which serves as the armed wing of the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP); the Shan State Army – South (SSA-S), which serves as the armed wing of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) and is part of the Shan State Congress; Pa-O National Army (PNA); Pa-O National Organisation (PNO); and the Shanni Nationalities Army (SNA).
Ethnic and political dynamics
The ethnic groups in Northern Shan State, with deep cultural and ethnic ties to China, are regarded as “reliable partners” by local Burmese observers, who believe that they are unlikely to act against Beijing’s interests. In contrast, other ethnic factions in Myanmar, such as those in the Anya theatre, including Bamar groups, Karenni, Kayins, and Chins, do not share the same rapport with China. The Arakan Army, though it has tried to project itself as independent of China’s direct influence, is a significant part of the Northern Alliance and the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BA), both of which are within China’s sphere of influence.
China’s recent focus has been on Lashio, the largest town in northern Shan State, situated at the end of the historically significant “Burma Road,” which links Lashio to Yunnan Province in southeast China. Clearly, China aims to empower the EAOs, capitalising on their recent successes, to have a greater role and even take over administrative control in northern Shan. According to sources within the 3BA, the “Haigeng Agreement,” announced on January 12, and the subsequent ceasefire were based on China’s assurances to facilitate the 3BA’s access to Lashio.
China’s plan involves a give-and-take approach: the junta would cede certain areas of northern Shan in exchange for a reduction in military advances by the EAOs. Beijing hoped that this concession would prompt the military to retreat from some territories, thereby persuading the Brotherhood to halt its efforts to overthrow the military dictatorship. Additionally, China aimed to mediate a truce between the two sides and persuade the 3BA to collaborate with the military to stabilize the situation, particularly to safeguard Chinese projects. In exchange, the 3BA would receive a share of the revenue and gain the ability to establish independent bases free from military interference.
However, this policy has not materialized as the junta has refused to give up Lashio without a fight. According to a senior Shan ethnic leader, China wanted to avoid a forceful occupation of Lashio to minimise fighting and turmoil in the region, but the military does not want to give up control and maintains a strong presence in northern Shan State, trying to retain some of its positions.
The junta leadership reportedly informed Beijing—through both current and former officials, some of whom are close to Chinese Premier Xi Jinping—that it has played a crucial role in revitalizing Chinese infrastructure projects in northern Shan, such as the Upper Yeywa hydroelectric dam on the Shweli River, which had been stalled since the civilian government took over in 2015. This emphasis on their contributions is said to be why the junta refuses to relinquish Lashio without a fight leading the military leadership to oppose the ceasefire and attack rebel positions.
Navigating the uncertain road ahead
Several factors must be considered when discussing China’s role in the present crisis and its plans for the future. From observations on the ground, public information, and insights from Chinese representatives, China has not changed its long-term policy on Myanmar, primarily focusing on a pro-Beijing regime in Naypyidaw. This is exemplified by China’s consistent engagement with the junta, which, despite facing multiple problems and setbacks, has managed to stay afloat.
One key reason for China’s involvement is to prevent instability along its borders, safeguard investments, and avoid conflicts in northern Shan. The Chinese leadership recognizes that an unstable Myanmar could trigger refugee crises, cross-border crimes, and threats to Beijing’s traditional sphere of influence in the region. Thus, for China, ensuring the stability and security of its borders is paramount, and it will continue to engage with all stakeholders in Myanmar to maintain this stability.
China’s plans in Myanmar are undoubtedly driven by its concern for its investments, particularly in Rakhine, and its view of the opportunity to fill the power vacuum left by Western actors. Clearly, China aims not just to maintain the status quo but to secure its long-term strategic interests.
However, one might argue that China’s ‘not one size fits all’ policy for Myanmar lacks clarity, marked by contradictions and an absence of a cohesive strategy. Nonetheless, given the current situation, the Chinese leadership is doing everything possible to push the Burmese leadership to develop a “bail-out” plan, with holding elections appearing to be the top priority. Besides this, China has urged the SAC hierarchy to initiate talks with EAO leadership and convince them to come to a dialogue to work out a consensual plan for holding elections.
As always, Beijing does not want to be seen as taking sides and will continue its position of engaging with every faction, whether intervening in inter-ethnic conflicts or between the NUG and the junta. Therefore, it should come as no surprise if China plays a significant role in influencing the future direction of the conflict and even in facilitating a reconciliation formula between the NUG and the junta.
Despite its portrayed role, it is evident that guns, ammunition, and sophisticated equipment from China have been reaching Myanmar’s junta and rebel groups through various conduits, primarily via Thailand. While there is ongoing talk of peace and reconciliation, halting the flow of money, weapons, and drugs is nearly impossible as the Golden Triangle remains unpoliceable. The fact remains that the 100km river corridor connecting China to the Golden Triangle—where Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand meet—has long been a hotspot for unchecked and illegal trade, enabling various armed groups to easily access arms and ammunition.
China’s involvement in Myanmar’s conflict reflects a sophisticated blend of strategic foresight and opportunism. By encouraging stability along its borders, fostering economic ties with select ethnic groups, and navigating the political landscape in Myanmar, Beijing maintains its influence while preparing for future developments.
Strategic shifts post-Lashio
Given the current developments, the fall of Lashio raises the question of whether the conflict will now shift to the military stronghold of Pyin Oo Lwin, formerly known as ‘Maymyo’ during British rule. Pyin Oo Lwin, which houses critical military academies, has become a fortified bastion for the Myanmar junta in the northern Shan State. Local news reports have it that since June 25, the junta has bolstered its defences by deploying Mi-35 attack helicopters and fighter jets to Anesakhan Airport in Pyin Oo Lwin, and has urgently restocked ammunition supplies. Anti-drone jammers have been installed at key facilities, including the Defence Services Academy (DSA), Defence Services Technological Academy (DSTA), Technology Research Institute, and the state guesthouse within the Defence Services Administration School compound.
This base has been instrumental in countering the offensives launched by the TNLA in Nawnghkio (Naungcho), located just 35 miles away. The TNLA has seized control of Nawnghkio and Kyaukme, which lies on the Lashio-Mandalay road, potentially setting the stage for a complete takeover. A senior NUG leader has remarked, “If Lashio falls, it means Pyin Oo Lwin is next.”
However, it remains uncertain how events will unfold in the wake of the Lashio incident. Two scenarios are possible: either the armed alliance under the 3BA, along with other groups such as the PDFs and the BPLA will escalate their offensives targeting other significant junta strongholds like Pyin Oo Lwin, Meiktila, and Mandalay; or the EAOs would scale back their hostilities in favour of engaging in a Chinese-mediated peace process and elections.
The extension of the emergency by six months by Myanmar’s SAC also prompts the question of whether the fall of Lashio will affect the junta’s plans for elections and a census. If Beijing is indeed guiding the strategy, then the resolution of the junta’s situation and the broader Myanmar conflict remains far from certain.
