The Government of India has recently approved a significant budget allocation of ₹31,000 crore for fencing along the India-Myanmar border as part of intensified security measures responding to the ongoing Manipur crisis since May 2023. Spanning a length of 1,643 kilometres, the Indo-Myanmar border touches the states of Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, and Nagaland, regions already grappling with complex ethnic and security challenges. This fencing initiative reflects a decisive move following the government’s decision to terminate the Free Movement Regime (FMR) on the Indian side, a policy that once allowed local border communities to cross up to 16 kilometres into each other’s territories without the need for a visa.
The border fencing decision stems from the violence in Manipur, marked by a deadly conflict between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo ethnic communities. Over 200 lives have been lost, with villages and homes decimated, resulting in the displacement of over 60,000 people. Though the situation remains volatile after more than a year, the crisis is partly attributed to alleged infiltration from Myanmar, with rumours suggesting the involvement of armed insurgents crossing into Manipur and intensifying the local unrest. These alleged “Kuki militants” are believed to have exacerbated the conflict, and Indian authorities are concerned about the unchecked flow of both insurgents and illegal immigrants across the porous border.
With the FMR now scrapped, individuals from Myanmar can no longer enter India’s territory without proper documentation. The FMR was a core component of the Act East Policy, which aimed to bolster cross-border cultural and economic exchanges, ensuring people-to-people connectivity and improving trade between local communities. Originally designed under the Look East Policy—revised to Act East in 2014 to emphasise Northeast India’s integration—FMR provided border communities with the flexibility to traverse the boundary for essential cultural and economic reasons, such as family gatherings, traditional festivals, and local trade.
However, India’s recent stance on fencing and the FMR’s revocation has faced considerable opposition from communities along the border. In particular, civil society groups and leaders from Nagaland and Mizoram have voiced strong resistance, arguing that these changes threaten their way of life. Mizoram’s Chief Minister Lalduhoma conveyed his stance to the Home Ministry, urging for the FMR’s continuation in Mizoram, while the Nagaland Assembly passed a formal resolution against both the FMR’s cessation and the proposed border fencing. These communities share deep familial and social connections with people on the other side of the border, with their lives and livelihoods deeply intertwined with cross-border movement.
The fence and FMR termination are predicted to significantly affect not only physical movement but also social, emotional, and economic ties, with repercussions on local economies reliant on cross-border trade. Border residents fear losing their economic lifeline, with many depending on inter-community trade that has flourished under the FMR’s allowances.
The Myanmar military coup in early 2021 prompted a large influx of refugees into Northeast India, exacerbating concerns about cross-border security and community strain in the region. Manipur, though lacking official refugee counts, is estimated to be hosting over 5,000 displaced individuals, while Mizoram reports accommodating over 30,000. This influx has escalated security apprehensions, particularly in light of the intensifying Manipur crisis.
While the decision to fence the border and revoke the FMR reflects India’s intent to curb armed movements and unregulated migration, questions about its practicality remain. Rahul K. Bhonsle, Director of Security Risk Asia and a military veteran, notes that fencing may not be feasible due to the challenging mountainous and forested terrain. He suggests that rather than fencing the entire border, a more cost-effective approach would be to block specific established routes used by migrants and insurgents. According to Bhonsle, “It would have been more cost-effective to block those routes rather than in the costly fencing of the entire length of the border.”
He further highlights the historical and familial connections binding communities across this border, asserting that fencing and FMR revocation will likely provoke resentment among Northeast India’s population, who already harbour a sense of estrangement from the Indian mainstream. Bhonsle stresses that these communities should be considered partners in security, rather than being perceived as adversaries.
Myanmar, entangled in its internal conflict resembling civil war, has yet to respond to India’s actions regarding the FMR. According to Bhonsle, “At present, Myanmar is going through its own crisis bordering on civil war, thus reaction on the FMR is unlikely soon.” He also calls for a comprehensive review of border management policy, advocating that collaboration with local communities is vital for sustainable security.
The closures of border gates, such as the “Indo-Myanmar Friendship Gate” in Manipur, have continued since the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, and now, amidst the ongoing crisis in Manipur, reopening appears unlikely. Mizoram’s border gate, too, remains shut, with reopening plans delayed in the face of recent developments.
As India advances security measures along the Indo-Myanmar border, the government faces a challenging task of balancing national security with the socio-economic and cultural realities of the region’s communities. The question remains whether heightened security—through border fencing and FMR termination—can ultimately achieve peace and stability in Manipur and Northeast India, or whether it risks alienating border communities in the process.
