The recent disengagement agreement signed between India and China on October 21 has sparked cautious optimism, yet it also underscores a deeper narrative of distrust rooted in historical patterns. China’s strategy has often mirrored the teachings of Sun Tzu, favouring psychological manoeuvres, diplomacy, and deception over outright conflict. However, Beijing’s actions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) since 2020 have revealed an unsettling shift—a blend of aggressive posturing and calculated retreats designed to test India’s resolve while maintaining an air of strategic ambiguity.
This disengagement, while a step forward, raises critical questions: Is it a genuine move towards peace, or another tactical pause in China’s long game of territorial assertion? History offers little reassurance. From the Galwan clash to the occupation of critical zones like Depsang and Demchok, China has repeatedly violated agreements, only to revert to diplomatic overtures when faced with resolute opposition. This pattern reflects not a departure from Sun Tzu’s philosophy but its modern adaptation—leveraging disengagement as a tool to lull adversaries into complacency while quietly consolidating gains.
The narrative becomes even more circumspect when considering China’s broader challenges. Internally strained by economic slowdowns and externally encircled by geopolitical pressures, Beijing’s moves along the LAC are as much about testing boundaries as they are about managing its strategic vulnerabilities. Against this backdrop, can India afford to trust a regime that has turned reneging on agreements into a fine art of statecraft?
Dr Srikanth Kondapalli, Professor of Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, emphasises that while Chinese philosophies of warfare suggest one approach, the reality on the ground often unfolds differently. According to him, the post-Galwan dynamics have left Beijing with little choice but to engage with India and avoid misadventures due to their high costs. However, he cautions that this does not prevent China from continuing its pattern of subtle reassertion, such as renaming places in Arunachal Pradesh or quietly asserting its presence whenever relations improve. To explore these complexities further, The Borderlens Editor-in-Chief Bidhayak Das engaged Dr Kondapalli in a detailed conversation, shedding light on the implications of the disengagement agreement and the long-term trajectory of India-China relations. Below are key excerpts from the interview.
The process of disengagement between India and China
Dr Kondapalli : The disengagement process is indeed in motion following the October 21 agreement. This is hopefully a step toward de-escalation, but the process will be slow, largely due to resistance from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to civilian leadership. As a result, any improvement in bilateral relations remains uncertain. Disengagement has been completed in two sectors—Depsang Plains and Demchok—but not across the entirety of Ladakh. The media often paints an overly optimistic picture, as if the entire issue has been resolved, but this is far from the truth. The Chinese embassy’s portrayal of a complete resolution is misleading. Disengagement in the Depsang sector, for instance, is experimental and limited to specific patrol points, leaving numerous disputes unresolved. We still have other sectors between patrol point 10 to patrol point 17. All these of course are part of Depsang.
Stability on the border: A prerequisite for disengagement
Dr Kondapalli : Stability is crucial, but challenges persist. Issues remain unresolved in the Sikkim sector and Arunachal Pradesh. After the recent agreement, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar expressed hope for further discussions on pending issues, including stability in inner patrolling points and overall border regions. While disengagement in Depsang and Demchok is a step forward, stability across all disputed sectors remains a critical goal.
The ground situation post-disengagement timeline completion (October 29, 2024)
Prof. Kondapalli : Previously, troops from both sides were in an eyeball-to-eyeball standoff, but now they have moved apart. To maintain troops along the LAC, robust supply chains and logistics are essential. Despite this, troop mobilisation remains at full strength. Only temporary structures, such as tents, have been dismantled; we lack clarity on whether permanent structures, underground defence systems, or other constructions from the past four years have been removed.
Violations of agreements by China
Prof. Kondapalli : Considering repeated violations of agreements, including Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), we cannot trust the Chinese. With the CBMs in place, we initially believed they would not occupy territories. However, they have occupied as much as 500 sq. km in Depsang and Demchok and have not withdrawn from these areas. If they have disregarded past agreements, what guarantees exist that they will adhere to the current ones? This explains the prevailing suspicion and highlights China’s methodically slow approach.
India’s engagement with China before and after June 2020
Prof Kondapalli : We are engaging them at various levels asking for protocols. Of course, this could be violated as we saw in June 2020, but we are asking for additional protocols and other things. So, it’s a very slow process. The fact that we had 20 Indian soldiers killed that is the turning point in not believing the Chinese in what they are agreeing right now. Because these things we have agreed to in 1993 (Signed on September 7 1993, to Maintain Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control the agreement provides the “framework for border security between the parties until final determination is made regarding border demarcation.” The parties agree to keep “military forces in the areas along the line of actual control to a minimum level” and “reduce troop levels” compatible with friendly and good relations between them. (Art. 2.) They also agree to carry out confidence-building measures along the LAC control, including by providing prior notification of “military exercises of specified levels near the line of actual control permitted under this Agreement.” (Art. 2.))
What about the agreements with China Since 1988?
Prof. Kondapalli : Precisely this is what Minister S Jaishankar has said that they have violated these agreements without telling us why thy violated these agreements. Why they have done this, they have not given the reason so far. In 2017 after the Doklam incident, the Chinese proposed new CBMs, because the CBMs did not work in Doklam. We proposed new CBMs on the sidelines during the BRICs summit in Xiamen. However, these were never codified, and then came the Galwan incidents. Then we had the Galwan incidents. This resulted in jettisoning all the CMBs we have signed so far.
The October 21 agreement and new CBMs
Prof. Kondapalli : We have to look for new CBMs which are binding. One of the measures is to have structed protocols and see the progress on the ground If they say we want bhai bhai then that has to reflect on the ground. If it does not reflect then we remain circumspect and the progress will be very slow. We don’t know they may come tomorrow and unleash two brigades. The 1993 agreement says that you cannot mobilise forces of more than 5000. So that is a brigade level. So, you cannot mobilise forces of more than 500 with the LAC acts as the strategic orientation. This means you can go from the border areas to other areas, but not towards the LAC. But this precisely what happened from October 2019 onwards when two brigades that is 5000 plus 5000, these were unleashed by the Chinese. They have not explained so far why this has happened. Now as part of the normalization, as part of the CBMs etc, if we have disengaged what is the guarantee that you are not coming back and occupying the areas which I vacated? So that is the problem now.
Impact of recent high-level meetings post October 21
Dr Kondapalli : While leaders met during events like the BRICS summit and G20 meetings, governments require more than assumptions. Written agreements, too, have been violated in the past. The question remains: how can we trust future discussions when past commitments have been broken? This trust deficit severely limits the scope of progress.
The future of India-China relations amid a history of distrust
Dr. Kondapalli : Realistically, dramatic changes are unlikely, given the history and repeat of history. Also, the fact of matter is that the Chinese now realise that India’s resilience—demonstrated by its ability to maintain troops in harsh conditions without significant casualties. This sends a strong message. The cost of any misadventure is problematic with the other side as well as with us. So, we are going slow because there is nothing that is urgent in the bilateral relations The Chinese are saying liberalise the visa regime, we said why? They are saying have direct flights, we are saying why open up the air space for direct flights, what is the urgency? We are putting enough pressure on them by saying that these are not really urgent. First you discuss the border stability then we can discuss other things. So, if it is in October we decide and if we don’t not have any bilateral agreements it means that means actually there is hard bargaining going on.
India’s strategic upper hand
Dr Kondapalli : India’s acclimatisation to higher altitudes and sub-zero temperatures, such as those in Siachen, is evident in its ability to hold ground in harsh winter conditions in Ladakh for four years. Over this period, India has effectively improvised along the border, standing firm in temperatures as low as minus 30–40 degrees Celsius. While the effort has imposed financial costs, it has come without a single casualty, highlighting the resilience of Indian forces. In stark contrast, China has faced significant struggles, with nearly 110 soldiers reportedly lost to harsh weather conditions. Strategically, India’s resolve remains unwavering, even as China grapples with mounting challenges, including the looming 2027 Taiwan invasion scenario and tensions in the South China Sea. This positions India in a place of relative strength. China’s desperation is increasingly evident in its actions, such as renaming locations in Arunachal Pradesh and spreading propaganda about the Yarlung Tsangpo Dam. These efforts are little more than distractions and tools for shaping perceptions, underscoring Beijing’s underlying challenges.
Therefore, finally it can said that while the disengagement agreement marks a step forward, the long road to trust and stability remains fraught with challenges. As Dr. Kondapalli aptly summarises, “Progress will depend on actions matching words, ensuring stability on the ground, and binding agreements that withstand the test of time.”
