The reconciliation between warring factions in the Chin Hills of Myanmar marks a significant shift in the region’s conflict landscape. This development could bring much-needed stability along India’s northeastern borders, where security concerns have been mounting due to the complex and evolving situation in Myanmar and Bangladesh. The merger agreement between the Chinland Council (CC) and the Interim Chin National Consultative Council (ICNCC), signed in Aizawl in the presence of Mizoram Chief Minister Lalduhoma, aims to consolidate Chin forces and prevent external anti-India elements from exploiting regional instability.
According to highly placed sources, one of the key objective behind the agreement is to maintain security along the India-Myanmar border and prevent infiltration by anti-India elements, particularly from Bangladesh. While the broader security situation along the border has remained stable despite turmoil in Myanmar, certain regions like Moreh-Tamu in Manipur have witnessed occasional flare-ups. However, the primary threat has come from the valley-based insurgent groups of Manipur, collectively known as VBIGs, which have aligned themselves with Myanmar’s military junta.
Mizoram, sharing a 510-kilometre border with Myanmar, has been significantly affected by the ongoing conflict, with thousands of refugees seeking shelter in its bordering districts, particularly Champhai, Lawngtlai, and Siaha. As per estimates from the Mizoram government, approximately 35,000 refugees currently reside in makeshift camps along the border. The continuing influx of displaced people from Chin State and the persistent clashes between the Myanmar military junta and various Chin groups have raised concerns in New Delhi about potential security spillovers into Indian territory.
The reconciliation between the CC and ICNCC was largely facilitated by the Mizoram Chief Minister, with active support from the Indian central government. The Ministry of External Affairs played a crucial role in advancing the process, with sources in New Delhi stating, “The primary concern has been the complexity of the conflicts in Myanmar and Bangladesh, not to mention the growing challenges in Rakhine.” Government official point to reports which suggesting heightened activity at the Myanmar-Bangladesh-India trijunction, raising concerns about potential threats to India’s national security.
This Chin reunification is believed to be part of a larger strategic plan formulated by Indian security experts to counter emerging threats in the neighbourhood. Reports indicate that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has intensified its operations in and around Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), aiming to create a common platform for groups hostile to India’s interests. The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a leading Rohingya insurgent group, has reportedly been included in this strategy.
Strategic implications of the Chin merger
The reunification of the CC and ICNCC carries multiple strategic benefits for India. Firstly, it enhances security along Mizoram’s border by regulating cross-border movements and preventing the influx of unwanted elements. Secondly, it signals a more proactive Indian engagement with non-state actors in Myanmar, a shift from its traditional approach. Thirdly, it offers a mechanism to address security concerns in Manipur by checking the movement of Myanmar-based Kuki groups, which have been accused of exacerbating tensions in the state.
While no concrete evidence has surfaced, Manipur Chief Minister Biren Singh has consistently alleged that Kuki-Chin migrants from Myanmar played a role in the recent communal violence in his state. He has also claimed that thousands of Burmese Kuki-Chins have illegally entered Manipur since Myanmar’s military coup, although these assertions remain unsubstantiated.
Additionally, the consolidation of Chin factions could thwart attempts by Islamist groups in Bangladesh’s CHT to exploit regional instability. Intelligence inputs indicate that ISI has been attempting to leverage radical networks, particularly the Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya, and its allied groups, including the Kuki-Chin National Front (KCNF). New Delhi is aware of these developments and is actively formulating countermeasures to preempt any potential security threats.
For the first time, an Indian Chief Minister has played a central role in brokering an agreement between two significant Burmese factions. The armed wings of both groups, the Chin National Army (CNA) of the CC and the Chin Brotherhood (CB) of the ICNCC, were also present during the merger ceremony. However, while the agreement represents a strategic breakthrough, its success depends on the willingness of all Chin factions to cooperate.
Challenges in Chin unity
Despite the merger, deep-seated divisions persist within the Chin community. Disagreements over governance, territorial control, and military strategy have repeatedly led to violent clashes among Chin factions. One of the most contentious issues has been the adoption of the interim constitution for Chinland in December 2023. This led to the formation of the Chin Brotherhood Alliance (CBA) on December 30, 2023, by a coalition of Chin Defence Forces (CDFs) from Falam, Kanpetlet, Matupi, Mindat, and Tedim. The CBA, backed by the Zomi Federal Union, Chin National Organization, Mindat Chin National Council, Maraland Defense Force (MDF), and Kampelet Chin Defense Force, has positioned itself in opposition to the CC’s governance framework.
Over the years, the Chin National Front (CNF), one of the oldest insurgent groups formed in 1988, has established itself as a dominant force. However, its participation in Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015 sparked controversy within the Chin community, as many opposed any engagement with the military junta. Additionally, CNF’s opposition to the Arakan Army’s (AA) occupation of Paletwa township remains a point of contention. The AA claims Paletwa as its own, despite it being geographically part of Chin State, and has garnered support from the CBA in return for assistance in its broader fight against the junta. This dispute has already resulted in armed confrontations, including CC’s attack on the Maraland Defense Force in February 2024 and clashes between CNF and CBA forces in Matupi Township in June 2024.
At the heart of the Chin conflict lies a historical rivalry between various ethnic groups within Chin society. The Chin community comprises dozens of “tribes”, each with distinct cultural traditions and languages. Historically, the Falam tribe held considerable influence, but in recent years, the Hakha have emerged as the most powerful group. This ethnic divide is reflected in the political and military allegiances of different Chin factions. Generally, the Chinland Council enjoys the support of central Chin State tribes, while the Chin Brotherhood Alliance garners backing from northern and southern Chin State groups. However, the allegiances are not strictly geographical, as villages and towns have one PDF that supports the Chinland Council and one that supports the CBA.
According to some Chin activists, the generational divide also plays a crucial role in shaping the conflict. While younger Chins, influenced by modern political ideologies and international exposure, push for aggressive military resistance against the junta, older generations, including church leaders, advocate for a more measured approach. The interplay of these diverse influences complicates efforts to unify the Chin factions under a single political or military strategy.
While the Chin merger represents a step towards regional stability, it remains fragile. The persistence of inter-group disputes, coupled with external pressures from Myanmar’s military, Bangladesh-based radical elements, and broader geopolitical factors, could destabilise the reconciliation process. Long-term stability will require continued diplomatic engagement, careful management of ethnic tensions, and a comprehensive strategy to align Chin factions in their broader resistance against the military junta.
